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Born to Lose: The Illinois "Baby Richard"
Case--How Examining His Father's Pre-Birth
Conduct Might Have Led to a Different
Ending for Richard
"In the little world in which children have their existence,
whosoever brings them up, there is nothing so finely perceived
and so finely felt, as injustice."'
INTRODUCTION

Rarely does the legal system, and its often seemingly harsh results, so
dominate the public's consciousness as when a child is at the heart of an
issue. In late spring of 1995, the American public 2 was afforded a frontrow seat to the real-life, human impact of the courts' decisions in the longrunning "Baby Richard" case.' Courtesy of television and painstakingly
detailed newspaper accounts, the nation stood witness as the four-year-old
boy known as Richard was wrenched from the arms of his adoptive mother-the only mother he had ever known--and whisked away by the biological
father who had waged a nearly four-year legal battle to win him.4
The agonizing scene marked yet another chapter of the Illinois "Baby
Richard" child adoption and custody case--a legal dispute that rivaled the
famous "Baby Jessica" case' in publicity, emotions and fiery public outcry.

1. CHARLES DICKENS, GREAT EXPECTATIONS 92 (Penguin Books 1965) (1861).
2. See generally Janan Hanna, Peter Kendall, Wrenching Day for 'Richard': Boy
Begins Trip in Tears, Ends It Calmly, CHI. TRIB., May 1, 1995, at Al.
3. In general, discussions of the "Baby Richard" case refer to the circumstances
involving the boy, known as "Richard," born to Daniella Janikova and the subsequent
adoption and custody struggle between the child's biological father, Otakar Kirchner, and the

child's adoptive parents, Robert and Kim Warburton, referred to in court documents and
hereafter in this comment as the "Does." The court decisions directly bearing on the "Baby
Richard" controversy are: In re Petition of Doe, 627 N.E.2d 648 (Il. App. Ct. 1993), rev'd,
638 N.E.2d 181 (Ill.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 499 (1994); In re Petition of Doe, 638 N.E.2d
181 (Ill.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 499 (1994) [Baby Richard I]; In re Petition of Kirchner,
649 N.E.2d 324 (Il. 1995) [Baby Richard II].
4. See Hanna and Kendall, supra note 2, at Al.
5. In re Clausen, 502 N.W.2d 649 (Mich. 1993). The highly publicized case, known

as the "Baby Jessica" case, involved a woman, Cara Clausen, who gave birth to a girl and
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In the roughly two years the case was in the spotlight, the "Baby Richard"
controversy sparked often impassioned and even rancorous public debate. 6
The controversy reached its peak in June 1994, when the Illinois Supreme
Court reversed the lower courts and awarded custody of Richard to his
biological father.7 The ruling sparked outrage among many in the public
and the media, bitter emotional exchanges between high public officials, the
media and the court,' and prompted the Illinois General Assembly, at the
urging of Governor Jim Edgar, to frantically pass a measure 9 aimed at
reversing the high court's decision. When Richard was finally transferred to
his biological parents in the wrenching scene outside the adoptive parents'
Schaumburg home, even ardent supporters of the supreme court's decision
were pained."0
Aside from the fact that the fate of a living, breathing child was being
decided, it is fair to assume that at least part of the public's interest and
signed a release of custody form less than 72 hours after the child was born to effect an
adoption. The child's father, who had not originally been named by Clausen, contested the
adoption and was ruled not to have been found unfit. The child was subsequently returned
to her natural parents. Id.
6. See generallyJan Crawford Greenburg, Momentum Builds to Alter 'Baby Richard'
Decision, CHI. TRIB., July 1, 1994, at Al; Paul Driscoll, Gov. Edgar, Ill. Supreme Court
Justice at Odds over Baby Richard, AP, July 13, 1994, available in Westlaw, 1994 WL
10155753.
7. In re Petition of Doe, 638 N.E.2d 181 (Ill.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 499 (1994).
8. Driscoll, supra note 6. For an excellent illustration of how heated the rhetoric had
become, see Illinois Supreme Court Justice Heiple's emotion-charged defense of the court's
earlier ruling in his supplemental opinion upon denial of rehearing. In re Petition of Doe,
638 N.E.2d 181, 187 (Iil.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 499 (1994). Beginning with the
observation that he had "seldom before worked on a case that involved the spread of so much
misinformation," Justice Heiple fired potent salvos at Justice Rizzi, who wrote the First
District Appellate Court's opinion that the Illinois Supreme Court reversed, Chicago Tribune
columnist Bob Greene, Illinois Governor Jim Edgar and the Illinois General Assembly.
Justice Heiple pointed out that the fact that the child must be available for adoption-meaning that the rights of the natural parent or parents have been terminated-before
the child's 'best interests' are considered is known to "[any judge, lawyer or guardian ad
litem who has even the most cursory familiarity with adoption laws ....Justice Rizzi, if he
is to be taken at face value, does not know that." Id. at 189. In his indignant rebuke of
Greene, Heiple accused the columnist of taking part in "journalistic terrorism," accusing
Greene of using "incomplete information, falsity, half-truths, character assassination and
spurious argumentation." Id. at 189. He later criticized Edgar for taking part in a "crass
political move" by ramrodding into law the so-called "Baby Richard Law," and suggested the
governor and the state legislatures who supported it "might be well advised to return to the
classroom and take up Civics 101." Id. at 190.
9. Pub. Act No. 88-550 (July 4,1994) (amending the Illinois Adoption Act, 750 ILCS
50/1 et seq.) (West 1992).
10. Hanna & Kendall, supra note 2, at Al.
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emotional ties to the "Baby Richard" case stemmed from the unusual
circumstances that precipitated it. Through media accounts, the public
learned of the sad facts surrounding Richard's birth to his Czechoslovakianborn parents. The public was introduced to the mother, Daniella Janikova,
who conceived the baby while "in love" with the child's father, but spent
her final weeks of pregnancy in an abused women's shelter and took part in
a complex subterfuge to deceive and hide the baby from the father." They
also were introduced to the father, Otakar Kirchner, who twice declined to
marry the expectant mother carrying his child and left the country shortly
before her due date, ostensibly to care for a dying relative.' 2 Janikova
originally told others she was physically and mentally abused by Kirchner,
who was still in near-constant contact with a former lover during most of his
relationship with Janikova.' 3 Finally, they met the adoptive parents, who
said they decided to pursue the legally risky adoption of Richard because,
based on their discussions with Janikova, they feared for the boy's safety
and well-being if he were to be raised by Kirchner. 4
Much of the dispute over Kirchner's conduct boiled down to a he-said,
she-said standoff, particularly after Janikova reconciled with Kirchner and
recanted her accusations of abuse.' 5 However, it is certain the serious
questions concerning Kirchner's conduct before Richard's birth were at least
contributing factors to the shock and outrage sounded by much of the public
and many public officials over the Illinois Supreme Court's final ruling.
Many of these people, like the adoptive parents before them, worried about
Richard's safety and future well-being with a father who was accused of
such questionable pre-birth conduct. 6 Kirchner's pre-birth conduct was
examined summarily by the trial and appellate courts, which considered
Kirchner's behavior during Daniella's pregnancy as "going to the weight and
credence of the testimony" regarding abandonment after Richard was

1I.See Jan Crawford Greenburg et al., Love And War, 'Richard' Case Reads Like a
Novel, But for Those Involved - Especially One Small Boy - It's Very Real, CHI. TRIB., Jan.

29, 1995, at Al, and Jan. 30, 1995, at Al. See also In re Petition of Doe, 627 N.E.2d 648
(Il. App. Ct. 1993), rev'd, 638 N.E.2d 181 (111.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 499 (1994); and In
re Petition of Kirchner, 649 N.E.2d 324 (111.
1995). See also Dateline NBC: Profile: Baby
R; Biological Parents Fight to Regain Custody from Adoptive Parents of Three-and-a-HalfYear-Old Son (NBC television broadcast, July 28, 1994).
12. See sources cited supra note 1I.
13. See sources cited supra note 11.
14. See Ellen Warren, Love, Fear Stirred Adoptive Parents to Act, CHI. TRIB., Aug.
20, 1993, at Al. See also Greenburg et al., supra note 11; Dateline NBC, supra note 11.
15. See sources cited supra note 11.
16. See sources cited supra note 11.
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born. 7 While discussing pre-birth conduct, those courts granted the Does'
adoption of Richard based on Kirchner's post-birth conduct. 18 However,
because of the construction of Illinois' adoption laws, these pre-birth factors
were never considered by the Illinois Supreme Court. 9 The court voided
the Does' adoption of Richard because Kirchner was not deemed an unfit
parent, based on his conduct after the child was born.2 °
Although the pre-birth conduct of a biological father has not been held
to be relevant to his "fitness" for adoption purposes in Illinois,2 I there is
a growing legal recognition of the role of a biological father's pre-birth
conduct in establishing or divesting his parental rights. 22 For more than a
half-decade in Florida, for example, the parental rights of a biological father
have hinged, in part, on how that father treated the mother during her
pregnancy.23 In essence, Florida law recognizes that a man who abandons
his pregnant mate, or physically or emotionally abuses her, is an unfit parent
because he is not likely to assume all parental duties once his son or
daughter is born. 24 The consideration of a biological father's pre-birth
conduct toward the mother as part of his overall "fitness" as a parent also
has found support in other states, including Wisconsin and Kansas. 25
The facts involved in the "Baby Richard" case are not sufficiently clear
to indicate whether such a law would have had an impact on the fate of
"Baby Richard," but the brief discussion by the Illinois Appellate Court of

17. li re Petition of Doe, 627 N.E.2d 648, 654 (III. App. Ct. 1993), rev'd, 638 N.E.2d
181 (III.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 499 (1994).
18. Id.
19. In re Petition of Doe, 638 N.E.2d 181 (III.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 499 (1994);
In re Petition of Kirchner, 649 N.E.2d 324 (III. 1995). See also Dateline NBC: Profile:
Parenthood; Biological Parents Sue to Have Their Son Returned by Adoptive Family and
Courts Drag the Case Out for Four Years (NBC television broadcast, Feb. 3, 1995).
20. In re Petition of Doe, 638 N.E.2d 181 (111.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 499 (1994);
In re Petition of Kirchner, 649 N.E.2d 324 (111.1995).
21. See 750 ILCS 50/1 et seq. (West 1992).
22. See Jeffrey A. Parness, Pregnant Dads: The Crimes and Other Misconduct of
Expectant Fathers, 72 OR. L. REV. 901 (1993).
23. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63 et seq.; See also In re Adoption of Doe, 543 So. 2d 741
(Fla.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 964 (1989) (holding that a biological, unmarried father's prebirth conduct toward the mother can constitute abandonment for the purposes of the Florida
Adoption Statute and result in the loss of parental rights); In re Adoption of Baby E.A.W.,
658 So. 2d 961 (Fla. 1995) (holding that emotional abuse of an expectant mother by an
unmarried, biological father can constitute abuse under the Florida Adoption Statute and
thereby terminate his parental rights). See also infra notes 135-73 and accompanying text.
24. See sources cited supra note 23.
25. See WisC. STAT. ANN. § 48.415(6) and KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2136(h)(4). See
also supra notes 174-81 and accompanying text.
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Kirchner's pre-birth conduct suggests it might have been decisive.2 6
However, because Illinois law does not take paternal, pre-birth conduct into
account when deciding a biological father's "fitness," the court had no
reason to inquire further into Kirchner's conduct toward Janikova during her
pregnancy.2 7 In fact, the Illinois Supreme Court declined to address the
topic at all.28 It is altogether possible the allegations of physical and
mental abuse, as well as the purported abandonment, were invented by a
distraught, jealous Janikova 9 and would have no bearing on Kirchner's
fitness as a parent. Or, it could be a court examination of the issue would
have proven Janikova's original allegations were true30 and Kirchner would
have lost his right to contest the Does' adoption of Richard. In either case,
an open courtroom hearing and a formal judicial ruling on the matter would
have cleared the air on the matter and possibly relieved some of the
concerns that the Does and countless others held and undoubtedly still
hold 3 about Kirchner's fitness as a parent. Considering the ease with
which such a provision could be written into Illinois law,32 public officials
concerned with this aspect of the "Baby Richard" case and future adoption
quagmires would find it well worth the investment of time and effort to do
SO.
This comment will examine the facts and controversies of the Illinois
"Baby Richard" case, the legal issues resolved in the Illinois Supreme
Court's two decisions33 on the case, and a brief look at the status of
Illinois' adoption law in the wake of "Baby Richard." This will be followed
by an examination of the pre-birth, paternal responsibility provisions in the
laws of other states, particularly Florida, and how they have been treated by
the courts. The comment will then apply these laws to the Illinois Baby
Richard case, suggesting what effect they might have on existing Illinois law
and whether they would have affected Baby Richard's fate. Finally, the
comment will conclude with a look at whether such laws would be
26. In re Petition of Doe, 627 N.E.2d 648, 654-55 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993), rev'd, 638
N.E.2d 181 (Ill.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 499 (1994).
27. Id. at 654.

28. In re Petition of Doe, 638 N.E.2d 181 (I1.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 499 (1994).
29. See supra notes 11-16.

30. See supra notes 11-16.
31. See generally Adrienne Drell, DCFS Looks Into Neglect Call on Kirchners; Charge
Denied, CHI. SuN-TIMEs, May 13, 1995 (describing the handling of one anonymous tip to

state social workers that Kirchner was abusing Richard).

32. For a discussion of possible amendments to Illinois law, see infra notes 201-15 and

accompanying discussion.

33. In re Petition of Doe, 638 N.E.2d 181 (Il1.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 499 (1994);
In re Petition of Kirchner, 649 N.E.2d 324 (Il. 1995).
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worthwhile in Illinois.
I. THE ILLINOIS "BABY RICHARD" CASE
A.

EVENTS PRECEDING RICHARD'S BIRTH

The saga that became the "Baby Richard" case' began quietly in late
1988 in a small, neighborhood restaurant and tavern called the Elkhorn, in
the west Chicago suburb of Cicero, Illinois, where Otakar Kirchner first met
Daniella Janikova. 35 Kirchner, a thirty-two-year-old immigrant from the
former Czechoslovakia, quickly became infatuated with the twenty-one-yearold Janikova, who also had recently arrived from Czechoslovakia. Kirchner
began by giving Janikova English lessons, and their romance soon blossomed.36
However, at the same time, Kirchner was living with Maria Zuzicova,
a woman from his native Bratislava, Czechoslovakia. The couple had been
involved for some time, but Zuzicova was unable to bear children and
Kirchner's friends and family knew he badly wanted children. When
Zuzicova learned about Kirchner's budding relationship with Janikova, she
threw him out of their apartment. Kirchner and Janikova then moved in
together into an apartment on Chicago's north side where, in June of 1990,
Janikova became pregnant with the child who would become "Baby
37
Richard.
It was during the early stages of her pregnancy that Janikova began to
doubt the love and faithfulness of Kirchner. Shortly after she became
pregnant, the couple got a marriage license, but it expired before they could
marry. They got another one, but it too expired. Kirchner later claimed
they both were too busy to get married, but Janikova had become very
worried about Kirchner's lack of commitment. It was at this time that
Janikova learned Kirchner remained in regular contact with his former lover,
Zuzicova, with whom he still spent hours on the phone and often met at his
work. The situation sparked arguments between Kirchner and Janikova,
who became worried that Kirchner would leave her and take the baby after
she gave birth.38

34.
case, see
35.
36.
37.
38.

For citations to the three reported rulings referred to under the "Baby Richard"
supra note 3.
Greenburg et al., supra note 11, at Al.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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However, during the full term of the pregnancy, Kirchner financially
supported Janikova, paying for her prenatal care as well as all of her
expenses, including her food and clothing, as they shared the apartment.
During her pregnancy, Janikova did not work, but lived on Kirchner's
support. In preparation for Richard's birth, Kirchner prepaid her childbirth
and other medical expenses at St. Joseph's Hospital.39
But, as the pregnancy entered its eighth month, Kirchner abruptly
informed Janikova that he had to return to Bratislava, ostensibly to spend
time with his dying grandmother. Through neighbors and friends, Janikova
learned Zuzicova had traveled with Kirchner to Bratislava. The expectant
mother was told by Kirchner's aunt that he had married Zuzicova while
overseas. This became too much for the distraught Janikova and she moved
out of the apartment she shared with Kirchner and into a battered women's
shelter.40
When she moved into the shelter, Janikova told shelter workers that
Kirchner had physically and mentally abused her. Her accusations were
very general--in her application interview she said Kirchner had "pushed"
her--but she was admitted into the shelter.4 After the couple was married
and the court battle over "Baby Richard" began, Janikova said she made up
the abuse allegations in order to take advantage of the free housing offered
by the shelter. However, others who spoke to Janikova at the time said she
repeated the accusations in private.42
Janikova, who had begun working again, learned from a friend at work
the name of an attorney who could arrange for an adoption of her baby.
The attorney introduced her to John and Jane Doe, who would eventually
become "Baby Richard's" adoptive parents. At this time, Janikova repeated
to the Does her allegations that the child's father had abused her, but refused
to disclose Kirchner's name.43
In early February, Kirchner arrived back in Chicago to discover
Janikova had moved out. A couple of weeks later, Janikova left the shelter
and moved into her uncle's suburban home. When he learned where she
was staying, Kirchner called Janikova, but she refused his calls. He offered
her $500 in support through a mutual friend, but Janikova refused the cash.
However, in late February, the couple began making amends. On one

39. Id.; see also In re Petition of Doe, 627 N.E.2d 648, 649-51 (I1M.App. Ct. 1993),
rev'd 638 N.E.2d 181 (III.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 499 (1994).
40. Doe, 627 N.E.2d at 649-51.
41. Id.; see also Dateline NBC, supra note 11.
42. See Doe, 627 N.E.2d at 649-51; Dateline NBC, supra note 11.
43. See In re Petition of Doe, 627 N.E.2d 648, 649-51, (I11.
App. Ct. 1993), rev'd, 638
N.E.2d 181 (111.),
cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 499 (1994).
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occasion in spring, Janikova had sexual relations with Kirchner in his
apartment. But, the next day, Kirchner took time out to pick up Zuzicova
from the airport, a meeting of which Janikova soon learned."4 At this time,
Kirchner made repeated phone calls to Janikova's home, but did not visit the
home or write to Janikova. In addition, he neither checked with her doctor
concerning her prenatal care nor consulted an attorney about his legal rights
in connection with the baby.45
On March 16, 1991, Janikova checked into an Elk Grove Village
hospital, where she gave birth to Richard. When asked, she refused to name
the child's father. On the same day, Kirchner looked for Janikova at St.
Joseph's Hospital, but learned she had not checked in. Four days later,
Janikova signed a final consent form putting Richard up for adoption. On
the same day, the Does filed a petition to adopt Baby Richard, stating the
father was "unknown." On that day, the child was placed in the Does'
home.46
Meanwhile, Janikova's relatives, at the mother's request, informed
Kirchner the baby had died during childbirth. Kirchner did not believe them
and finally visited her uncle's home where she was staying, rummaging
through garbage pails for diapers or similar evidence of a baby's presence.
He also called local hospitals searching for evidence of a live birth. Finally,
between May 5 and 10, a mutual friend told Kirchner that Janikova had put
the baby up for adoption. On May 12, Janikova moved back into Kirchner's
apartment and admitted she had put the baby up for adoption. 47 On May
18, Kirchner spoke to an attorney about his custody rights and on June 6,
1991, he filed an appearance in the adoption proceeding.
B. ILLINOIS COURT DECISIONS

Nine days after Kirchner filed his appearance in the adoption proceeding, the trial court ruled that Kirchner had no standing to participate in the
proceeding. A month later, Kirchner filed a Petition to Declare Paternity
and, in December, he was determined by the court to be Richard's biological
father. On December 23, 1991, the Does filed an amended petition to adopt,
alleging Kirchner was an unfit parent and that therefore his consent was not
required for the adoption.48
An adoption trial was held May 5 and 6, 1992. At that time, the trial

44.
45.
46.
47.

Doe, 627 N.E.2d at 649-51.
Id.
Id.
Id.

48. Id.
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court found by the requisite clear and convincing evidence that Kirchner had
failed to show a "reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility as
to the welfare of a newborn child during the first thirty days after the
birth."4 9 On May 8, Kirchner was ruled an unfit parent whose consent was
not necessary to grant adoption.5" Five days later, a judgment for the
adoption of Richard was entered, with consent to the adoption granted by
Janikova but not by Kirchner. Kirchner appealed the trial court's ruling,
requesting the adoption be reversed and that Richard be turned over to him
and Janikova, whom he had finally married.5
In its ruling on the case, the Appellate Court of Illinois, First District,
Third Division, rejected Kirchner's contention.52 Writing for the court,
Justice Rizzi held that the "paramount issue" in the case was the "best
interests" of Richard, which were superior to the rights of both his biological
and adoptive parents.53 However, the court then acknowledged that
"resolution of the issue of parentage quickly is foremost in the best interest

49. The trial court relied on 750 ILCS 50/1(D) (West 1992), which defines "unfit
person" for the purposes of terminating a natural parents' rights. Doe, 627 N.E.3d at 649-51.
The statute defines "unfit person" as "any person whom the court shall find to be unfit to
have a child without regard to the likelihood that the child will be placed for adoption."
Among the seventeen possible grounds of unfitness is: "[flailure to demonstrate a reasonable
degree of interest, concern or responsibility as to the welfare of a newborn child during the
first 30 days after its birth." 750 ILCS 50/l(D)(1) (West 1992).
50. Doe, 627 N.E.2d at 649-5 1. Specifically, the court seized upon what it determined
was Kirchner's insufficient interest in the child during the first thirty days after birth. "Had
Mr. Kirchner, instead of probing through garbage bags, gone to [legal counsel] at that
juncture there would be no such proceedings here. She would have been in court, that is
Daniella Janikova, and she would have been telling the world where the child was and
disclosing what interests Mr. Kirchner had in the child. Instead of that in all this time that
he wasted trying to contact hospitals, and, again, looking through garbage, he found nothing."
Id. at 651.
51. Id.
52. Id.

53. Id. at 652. "If there is a conflict between Richard's best interest and the rights and
interests of his parents, whomever they may be, the rights and interests of the parents must
yield and allow the best interest of Richard to pass through and prevail. This tenet allows
for no exception." Id. In thus holding, the court distinguished In re Adoption of Syck, 562
N.E.2d 174 (II1. 1990), which held that the best interest of the child should not be considered
when determining whether a parent is unfit, by the facts of the cases. Also, the court pointed
out that the Illinois General Assembly, by amending 705 ILCS 405/2-14, "made it the public
policy of Illinois that the best interest of the child" ranks above the interests of parents in
making a permanent home for a child. The court also cited Giacopelli v. The Florence
Crittenton Home, 158 N.E.2d 613 (I1. 1959) and two other cases for the proposition that
superior rights of parents must yield to the best interests of the child. Doe, 627 N.E.2d at
652 n.2.
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'
Then the court, extrapolating from sections of the Illinois
of the child."54
Juvenile Court Act55 and the Federal Adoption Assistance and Child
Welfare Act of 1980,56 purported to apply its new doctrine. The court
ruled that, if a newborn has been placed with adopting parents and has lived
there for more than eighteen months, it would be contrary to the best
Since Richard
interest of the child to take him or her from that home.
old
and had lived
months
and
five
was, at the time of the ruling, two years
all but four days with the Does, the court ruled that "[p]lainly, it would be
contrary to the best interest of Richard to 'switch' parents at this stage of his
life."58
However, the court also affirmed the judgment of adoption on a second
ground--that Kirchner was indeed an unfit person to have a child--based at
least in part on evidence of Kirchner's pre-birth conduct. 59 The court ruled
that an examination of an unwed father's pre-birth conduct was relevant
with regard to the "weight and credence of the testimony and evidence in
the case." 6 The court ruled Kirchner "did virtually nothing that a responsible unwed man would do if he expected that a woman would soon give
birth to his child .... More needed to be done to demonstrate a reasonable
degree of interest, concern and responsibility for the welfare of one's
expected child."' 61 Specifically, the court focused on Kirchner's failure to
visit Janikova in person at her uncle's house to check on the welfare of the
expected child, his failure to write to Janikova about his concern for the
expected baby, his failure to check with Janikova's doctor regarding prenatal
care, his failure to "show any effort to participate in giving his expected
child a first name or surname," and his failure to consult a lawyer about his

54. Doe, 627 N.E.2d at 652.

55. 705 ILCS 405/2-14 (West 1992).
56. 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(C) (1988).

Doe, 627 N.E.2d at 653.
Id. at 654.
Id.
Id. Without citing authority, Justice Rizzi wrote:
One may rightfully infer that a man who has a reasonable degree of
interest, concern or responsibility as to the welfare of his newborn child
would have assiduously tracked what was happening during the pregnancy
and the birth of the child. It follows that when a court is considering
whether. a biological father has demonstrated a reasonable degree of
interest, concern or responsibility as to the welfare of his newborn child
during the first 30 days after the birth, the court may consider what
occurred during the entire pregnancy and birth as going to the weight and
credence of the testimony and evidence of the case.
Id. at 654 (emphasis added).
61. Id.
57.
58.
59.
60.
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rights and responsibilities as an unwed father prior to the child's birth.62
"Thus, the record clearly shows that ...Otakar was content 'to just let his
child be born' without any interest, concern or responsibility as to the care,
custody or welfare of the child., 6' Aside from a brief reference to
Kirchner's late-pregnancy visit to Czechoslovakia, the court did not mention,
either in its opinion or in its recitation of the facts, Kirchner's prior
questionable conduct toward Janikova that might have constituted further
evidence of "abandonment" or "neglect." 64 The facts surrounding those
incidents were not brought forth at the trial court level, presumably because
Illinois law does not formally authorize taking such conduct into account
when determining parental fitness.
The appellate court then found Kirchner's conduct within the thirty
days after Richard's birth was "consistent with his lack of interest and
concern shortly before Richard was born."65 Like the trial court, the
appellate court expressed skepticism about Kirchner's claims that he sifted
through the garbage at Janikova's uncle's house, contacted hospitals and
took other steps to determine if Janikova had given birth to a live child.
Instead, the court chided Kirchner for failing to directly contact Janikova
concerning the welfare of the child he suspected had been born alive and for
not consulting an attorney to determine his rights and/or responsibilities
concerning the child, whether it was alive or dead. "There is no evidence
that Otakar did anything else until May 12, 1991, or the first 57 days after
Richard was born, to determine whether Richard was living or dead," the
court wrote, adding that "[s]urely, the scant and churlish effort made by
Otakar to discover whether his child was alive or dead" did not show a
reasonable degree of interest in the child required by the statute. 66 As a
result, the court affirmed the trial court's granting of the adoption and
Richard remained with the Does.
Less than a year later, the Illinois Supreme Court, considering
Kirchner's appeal, reversed the appellate and trial courts.67 In an unusually
terse opinion (which was severely criticized by many in the public), Justice
62. Id. at 654-55.

63. Id. at 654-55. The court reiterated, "This fact goes to the weight and credibility
of the testimony and evidence as to what occurred within the first 30 days after the birth of
Richard." Id. at 655.
64. Id. at 654-55. For example, the court did not address Kirchner's alleged physical
and mental abuse Janikova cited upon entering the battered women's shelter, his steady
contact with his former lover during Janikova's pregnancy, or other allegations of pre-birth
misconduct.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 655 (citing 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(1) (West 1992)).
67. In re Petition of Doe, 638 N.E.2d 181 (11.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 499 (1994).
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Heiple briefly outlined the facts of the case, concentrating largely on the
deception of Kirchner in connection with the child's birth.68 Heiple ruled
that the trial and appellate courts' rulings that Kirchner failed to show a
reasonable degree of interest in Richard during the first thirty days after
birth was "not supported by the evidence" and consequently was against the
manifest weight of the evidence.69 The court ruled that Kirchner "made
various attempts to locate the child, all of which were either frustrated or
blocked by the actions of the mother," and that she was aided by the Does'
attorney, who failed to make efforts to discover Kirchner's identity before
commencing with the adoption.7" The court found that, because of the
circumstances, Kirchner "had no opportunity to discharge any familial
duty." Unlike the appellate court, the supreme court declined to consider
Kirchner's pre-birth conduct as bearing upon the veracity of his largely
unsubstantiated claims that he had tried to learn of his child's birth and,
hence, had indeed shown sufficient interest in Richard during the first thirty
days after birth. The court did not address Kirchner's pre-birth conduct
whatsoever, nor did it discuss the appellate court's analysis of such conduct
as bearing upon the weight and credibility of the testimony and evidence
regarding post-birth conduct, leaving the validity of the appellate court's
analysis of pre-birth paternal conduct uncertain.
Instead, the Illinois high court, in what emerged as the key holding of
the case, stated the lower courts missed the "threshold issue" by inappropriately considering the "best interests" of Richard in their rulings. The lower
courts incorrectly stated the hierarchy of rights in such cases, the supreme
court stated, by inappropriately placing the "best interests" of Richard above
the parental interests of Kirchner, whose rights as the biological father were,
in fact, superior. "Since, however, the father's parental interest was
improperly terminated, there was no occasion to reach the factor of the
child's best interests. That point should never have been reached and need
never have been discussed."7 2 Justice McMorrow, in a concurring opinion,
expanded on Justice Heiple's reasoning, pointing out that the lower courts'
rulings were not justified by the broad policy statement in the Illinois
Adoption Act that the "best interests and welfare of the person to be adopted
shall be of paramount consideration in the construction and interpretation of
this Act. 73 Justice McMorrow flatly stated that, notwithstanding the
68. Id. at 181-82.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Id. at 182.
Id.
Id.
Id.
In re Petition of Doe, 638 N.E.2d 181, 183 (II!. 1994) (McMorrow, J.,
concurring)
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Illinois Supreme Court which has "finally adjudicated the rights of particular
parties. ,
On April 30, 1995, some three months after the Illinois Supreme
Court's ruling and after prolonged, bitter negotiations between Kirchner and
the Does, a crying Richard was permanently handed over from his adoptive
parents to the Kirchners, whom he had never met.89 Richard was four
years old.
II. THE STATUS OF ILLINOIS ADOPTION LAW IN THE WAKE
OF "BABY RICHARD"

One of the most significant and likely enduring holdings of the "Baby
Richard" decision is the Illinois Supreme Court's reaffirmation of the
principle that a biological father cannot be deprived of the custody of his or
her child through a "best interests of the child" analysis until that father
either consents to an adoption or is adjudged to be "unfit."9 The "best
interests" analysis, upon which the Appellate Court of Illinois, First District,
based much of its decision to grant custody of Richard to his adoptive
parents, 9' is not even to be considered a relevant inquiry until the parent is
deemed "unfit."'92 Prior to the "Baby Richard" case and the Illinois General
Assembly's attempts to alter the outcome of the case through amendments
to the Illinois Adoption Act, the consent of both biological parents was
required before adoption.93 In cases where the biological father was
unwed, the law provided that the father must be notified of an adoption

88. See Kirchner, 649 N.E.2d at 336-37 (citing Sanelli v. Glenview State Bank, 483
N.E.2d 226 (Ill. 1985)).
89. Hanna & Kendall, supra note 2, at Al.
90. In re Petition of Doe, 638 N.E.2d 181, 182-84 (II1.), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 499
(1994).
91. In re Petition of Doe, 627 N.E.2d 648 (III. App. Ct. 1993), rev'd, 638 N.E.2d 181
(II1.), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 499 (1994).
92. Doe, 638 N.E.2d at 183. The court wrote:
To justify its conclusion, the appellate court in the present case found it
significant that the Illinois legislature has declared in the Adoption Act that
the "best interests and welfare of the person to be adopted shall be of
paramount consideration in the construction and interpretation of this Act."
I do not believe that this broad policy statement justifies the appellate
court's holding. Notwithstanding this statement of policy, the Adoption
Act nevertheless specifically requires that a parent who does not consent
to adoption must be found unfit before parental rights may be terminated.
Id. (citations omitted).
93. 750 ILCS 50/8(a) (West 1993) (amended 1994).
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proceeding, either through personal service' or, if he could not be found,
through publication.9 5 However, the law also provided that the unwed
biological father could be deemed unfit by clear and convincing evidence,
and hence his consent not required, if he failed to establish his paternity
within thirty days of being informed he was the father of the child9 or if
he failed to live with or hold himself out as the father of the child.97
These rulings were shaped in large part by the United States Supreme
Court, which has ruled that the Fourteenth Amendment98 establishes a
liberty interest in the parent-child relationship. Prior to 1972, unwed fathers
did not have custody rights to their children under Illinois law. 99 However,
in the 1972 case of Stanley v. Illinois,"° the United States Supreme Court
made the first of five rulings that defined the nature of a putative father's
due process rights.'0 ' In Stanley, the Court ruled an unwed father had a
federal due process right to a fitness hearing before he lost custody of his
children. The Court struck down Illinois law that presumed an unwed father
to have no parental rights, regardless of his relationship with his child. 2
The Court limited the breadth of Stanley six years later, in Quilloin v.
Walcott, 3 holding that the biological link between an unwed father and
the child he largely failed to support or visit was insufficient to guarantee
the man a constitutional right to veto the adoption of the child by the
mother's husband. But, in Caban v. Mohammed,'04 the Court struck down
under an Equal Protection challenge, a New York law which provided that

94. 750 ILCS 50/12a (West 1993).
95. 750 ILCS 50/7 (West 1993).
96. 750 ILCS 50/l(D)(n)(2) (West 1993) (amended 1994).
97. 750 ILCS 50/8 (West 1993).
98. "No State shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without the
due process of law .... " U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
99. See Susan Swingle, Comment, Rights of Unwed Fathers and the Best Interests of
the Child: Can These Competing Interests be Harmonized? Illinois' Putative Father Registry
Provides an Answer, 26 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 703 (1995).
100. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
101. A full discussion of the nature and evolution of parents' rights to custody of their
children under the Fourteenth Amendment would be beyond the scope of this article.
However, for excellent discussions of the topic, see, e.g., Annette R. Appell and Bruce A.
Boyer, Parental Rights vs. Best Interests of the Child: A False Dichotomy in the Context of
Abortion, 2 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 63 (1995), Kristin Morgan-Tracy, The Right of the
Thwarted Father to Veto the Adoption of His Child, 62 U. CIN. L. REV. 1695 (1994); and
Lynn Kirsch, Unwed Fathers and Their Newborn Children Placed for Adoption: Protection
the Rights of Both in Custody Disputes, 36 ARIZ. L. REV. 1011 (1994).
102. 405 U.S. at 651.
103. 434 U.S. 246 (1978).
104. 441 U.S. 380 (1979).
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an unwed father could not withhold consent to the adoption of his child,
regardless of his relationship with the child, while a mother retained such
a right. In the 1983 case of Lehr v. Robertson, 5 the Court reiterated the
importance of the relationship between the putative father and the child,
holding that a father who failed to establish a relationship with his child or
participate in a Putative Father Registry did not have a due process right to
notice of subsequent adoption proceedings. In Lehr, the Court held that a
"mere biological connection" is insufficient, by itself, to give a biological
father parentage rights.' 6 However, the Court recognized that an unwed
father who "accepts some measure of responsibility for the child's future"
might have constitutionally protected parentage rights.10 7 In the 1989 case
of Michael H. v. Gerald D.,108 the Court again trimmed back on an unwed
father's parental rights, although the holding appeared limited to rare
circumstances." ° In the case, the Court held that an unwed man determined to be the biological father of a child born to a married woman and
her husband does not have constitutionally protected parentage rights,
despite his substantial relationship with the child. However, despite the
apparent conflict with the holding in Stanley, the Court did not explicitly
overrule its prior decisions with the Michael H. ruling." 0
With these federal constitutional parameters set out establishing the
parentage rights, albeit limited, of a biological father, the Illinois Supreme
Court in 1990 clarified the process required before a biological parent's
rights could be terminated in Illinois. In what became, in essence, a
foreshadowing of the "Baby Richard" decision, the Illinois Supreme Court
ruled in In re Adoption of Syck that a biological parent must be found
"unfit" by clear and convincing evidence before his or her standing in an
adoption proceeding could be terminated."'
Until such a ruling of
"unfitness" is found, the "best interests of the child" analysis is premature

105. 463 U.S. 248 (1983).
106. Id. at 260. The Court emphasized that "the mere existence of a biological link
does not merit equivalent constitutional protection." Id. at 261.
107. Id. at 262.
108. 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
109. See Morgan-Tracy, supra note 101.
110. Id. at 1699, 1700.
Ill. In re Adoption of Syck, 562 N.E.2d 174 (III. 1990). In the case, the father of the
child was awarded custody after he and the mother divorced. When the father later remarried
and sought to adopt the child, the trial court found the mother to be an "unfit" parent because
of her infrequent contact with the child (which, in part, were due to the father's efforts). The
appellate court affirmed, but did so by applying a "best interests of the child" analysis. The
Illinois Supreme Court reversed, stating that a biological parent must be found by "clear and
convincing evidence" to be "unfit" before his or her parental rights could be denied. Id.
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and inappropriate.'' 2
During the "Baby Richard" controversy, the Illinois General Assembly,
in a hasty, eleventh-hour attempt to alter the outcome of the case, passed
what became known as the "Baby Richard Law."113 The legislation,
consisting of several amendments to the Illinois Adoption Act, included, in
part, provisions aimed largely at aiding a single child, Richard. Those
provisions required that a custody hearing be held promptly after an
adoption is vacated and that, during such a hearing, the "best interests of the
child" are to be of paramount concern to the court." 4 Among the other
amendments to the Adoption Act passed in response to the case was the
creation of a "Putative Father Registry, '. requiring unwed fathers to
register with the state within thirty days of the child's birth in order to6
preserve standing for the purposes of subsequent adoption proceedings.1
And, in order to prevent another situation which gave rise to the "Baby
Richard" case, in which Kirchner successfully claimed he was ignorant of
whether the child actually had been born, the legislature included language
providing that a "lack of knowledge of the pregnancy or birth is not an
acceptable reason for failure to register."'" 7 However, notwithstanding his

112. Id. "Only after a parent is found, by clear and convincing evidence, to be unfit
does a circuit court ruling on an adoption petition proceed to consider the child's best
interests and whether those interests would be served by the child's adoption by the
petitioners requiring termination of the natural parents' parental rights." Id. at 183.
113. The "Baby Richard Law" refers to several amendments to the Illinois Adoption
Act, which were made effective July 3, 1994. The amendments affected several acts,
including 750 ILCS §§ 50/1, 50/8, 50/11, 50/12(a), 50/12.1, 50/20, 50/20(a), and 50/20(b)
(West Supp. 1995).
114. 750 ILCS 50/20, 50/20(b). The legislature's emphasis upon the "best interests"
standard, which also was reiterated in 50/20(a), appears to be a wholehearted endorsement
of the original "Baby Richard" ruling by the First District Appellate Court. In that ruling,
later reversed and flatly criticized by the Illinois Supreme Court in the subsequent "Baby
Richard" rulings, Justice Rizzi found, in part, that the "best interests" standard was to be
paramount in the deciding Richard's fate. In re Petition of Doe, 638 N.E.2d 181, 182-84
(Ill.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 499 (1994). However, despite the legislature's efforts to aid
the Does in their efforts to retain custody of Richard, the Illinois Supreme Court ruled the
amendment was too late, holding that a law cannot impact a state high court decision which
has "finally adjudicated the rights of the particular parties." In re Petition of Kirchner, 649
N.E.2d 324, 336-37 (Ill.
1995).
115. See 750 ILCS 50/l(R) (defining "putative father" as: "a man who may be a child's
father, but who (1) is not married to the child's mother on or before the date that the child
was or is to be born and (2) has not established paternity of the child in a court proceeding
before the filing of a petition for the adoption of the child. The term includes a male who
is less than 18 years of age."
116. 750 ILCS 50/12.1.
117. 750 ILCS 50/12.1(g)(3).
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participation in the registry, the putative father must also participate in the
care of the child in order to preserve his right to withhold consent to the
adoption. Otherwise, the father's participation in the Putative Father
Registry merely guarantees his right to take part in a "best interests" hearing
for the child and not to withhold consent to the adoption. "' Sensitive to
the emotional devastation the long-running "Baby Richard" court battle
wreaked on all its participants, the legislature also inserted language
providing appeals to adoption orders be "prosecuted and heard on an
expedited basis.""19
Therefore, despite the amendments to the Adoption Act, Illinois law
still provides that if an unwed biological father, such as Kirchner, complies
with the requirements of the Putative Father Registry, 20 provides care and
holds himself out as the child's father 2 and commences a parentage
action within the required thirty days, 122 he cannot be deprived of standing
in an adoption proceeding. 2 3 Unless he consents to the adoption or is
found to be "unfit"'124 by "clear and convincing evidence,' ' 25 the biologi118. 750 ILCS 50/12(a)(1.5). For an excellent analysis of the Putative Fathers Registry
and its impact in the wake of the "Baby Richard" case, see Swingle, supra note 99.
119. 750 ILCS 50/20.
120. 750 ILCS 50/8(B)(1)(B)(vii).
121. 750 ILCS 50/8(B)(l)(B)(iii).
122. 750 ILCS 50/12.1.
123. The impact of Illinois Adoption Act's new language requiring consideration of the
child's "best interests" has not yet been ruled upon by the state appellate or supreme courts,
but a legal battle in Cook County Circuit Court could provide a test. In that case, a
biological mother, Christina Miles, is seeking to regain custody of her daughter, whom she
entrusted to an acquaintance, Colleen Henry, after Miles was arrested during a two-month
visit to Texas. Miles never formally granted custody to Henry, but Henry had been granted
temporary custody of the child through a court order. After the trial court found Miles was
not an "unfit" parent, Henry claimed that under the "Baby Richard Law," the best interests
of the child must be considered, notwithstanding Miles' lack of consent to her daughter's
adoption. See generally Andrew Fegelman, 'Baby Richard' Law Faces 1st Test in Custody
Fight, Court Must Determine Girl's 'Best Interests.' CHI. TRIB., Apr. 28, 1995.
124. See 750 ILCS 50/1(d) (West 1992) (defining "unfit person" as "any person whom
the court shall find to be unfit to have a child, without regard to the likelihood that the child
will be placed for adoption.") The statute then lists seventeen "grounds of unfitness," nearly
all of which deal with a parent's conduct after the child's birth. Id. The only ground for
unfitness dealing with a parent's conduct prior to the child's birth is found in subsection (n),
which provides "unfitness" can be proven by:
Evidence of intent to forego his parental rights, whether or not the child is
a ward of the court .... (2) as manifested by the father's failure, where he
and the mother of the child were unmarried to each other at the time of the
child's birth, ...
(ii) to make a good faith effort to pay a reasonable
amount of the expenses related to the birth of the child and to provide a
reasonable amount for the financial support for the child ...
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cal father's parentage rights are preserved. While such preservation of
putative fathers' rights likely was a concern to lawmakers crafting the
amendments to the Adoption Act, it appears the amendments would not
have assuaged many of the concerns so vehemently trumpeted during the
"Baby Richard" controversy. Many in the public, echoing the concerns of
Richard's adoptive parents, expressed doubts about Richard's future with
Kirchner. 2 6 Many suggested that, based upon reports of Kirchner's
alleged conduct toward Janikova prior to Richard's birth, it was unlikely
Richard was being delivered into a quality or stable home with Kirchner.
If, indeed, part of the outrage over Richard's fate arose from heartfelt
concerns about the child's future with Kirchner, little has changed in Illinois
law to suggest the case would be decided any differently today, despite the
amendments to the Adoption Act. Provided an unwed, biological father
complied with the new and albeit stricter rules of the Putative Father
Registry, any past abuse, mistreatment or abandonment of the mother, would
remain irrelevant in deciding who wins custody of the child. Despite the
Illinois General Assembly's efforts to ensure children in adoption battles end
up in the better home environment, such lingering ignorance of a father's
pre-birth conduct remains a gaping hole in current Illinois adoption law.
III. RESPONSIBILITY OF THIRD PARTIES TO UNBORN CHILDREN
A. GENERAL OVERVIEW

A multitude of scholarly tomes could be compiled examining the status
and rights of the unborn throughout history and their ever-changing legal
status in the United States. Similarly, a significant amount of scholarship,
especially in recent years, has been dedicated to the constantly evolving
status and rights of putative fathers in relation to adoption and parentage
rights.'27 In much of this ongoing debate, nearly all of the discussion
Id.

125. In re J.P., 633 N.E.2d 27 (111.App. Ct. 1994); In Interest of Jones, 340 N.E.2d 269

(I11. 1975); In Interest of Bales, 403 N.E.2d 1344 (I11. 1980); In re Hoback, 419 N.E.2d 713

(I11.1981).
126. For a more complete discussion of this, see supra notes 2-18 and accompanying
text.
127. The list of articles examining this area of law is constantly growing, but among
some recent examples are: Mary L. Shanley, Unwed Fathers' Rights, Adoption, and Sex

Equality: Gender-Neutrality and the Perpetuation of Patriarchy, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 60

(1995); Mary A. Totz, What's Good for the Goose is Good for the Gander: Toward
Recognition of Men's Reproductive Rights, 15 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 141 (1994); Robin
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about the conduct of the putative father revolves exclusively around his acts
after the child is born. Debate has centered on when a putative father must
come forward to claim parentage rights, the biological father's relationship
with the child, how and when those rights are forfeited and how the interests
of the putative father, the adoptive parents and the child can be balanced. 2 However, only limited discussion has been devoted to the legal
duties and limits upon the conduct of the biological father before the child's
birth, either as the law currently exists or how it can be altered to help
courts make custody rulings. 9
In general, the efforts of the State to protect unborn children outside of
the area of abortion have fallen into three categories: protecting the unborn
from the acts of third parties, protecting fetuses from acts of the mother, and
regulating conduct of fathers toward their unborn child.130 The realm in
which the State has been most successful in its efforts to protect the unborn
has been when the fetus becomes the victim of criminal or tortious
conduct.' 3' In some cases, state courts have declined to read criminal
statutes to apply to all of the unborn, both viable and previable, and hence
have failed to convict upon the death of a fetus. 132 However, in a growing
number of states, lawmakers have passed legislation broadening the scope
of criminal offenses that can be used to protect the unborn. 133 Similarly,
DuRocher, Balancing Competing Interests in Post-Placement Adoption Custody Disputes:
How Do the Scales of Justice Weigh the Rights of Biological Parents,Adoptive Parents,and
Children?, 15 J. LEGAL MED. 305 (1994); Deborah L. Forman, Unwed Fathers and
Adoption: A Theoretical Analysis in Context, 72 TEx. L. REV. 967 (1994); Morgan-Tracy,
supra note 101; Kirsch, supra note 101.
128. A growing amount of attention in this area is being paid to so-called "putative
father registries," such as the one the Illinois General Assembly crafted to help avoid another
Baby Richard fiasco. 750 ILCS 50/12.1. See supra notes 13-16 and accompanying text.
129. Among the few works devoted specifically to this topic are three written by Jeffrey
A. Parness: PregnantDads: The Crimes and OtherMisconduct of Expectant Fathers,72 OR.
L. REV. 901 (1993); Prospective Fathers and Their Unborn Children, 13 U. ARK. LIrrLE
ROCK L.J. 165 (1991); The Abuse and Neglect of the Human Unborn: Protecting Potential
Life, 20 FAM. L. Q. 197 (1986).
130. Parness, supra note 22.
131. Id. at 903-04.
132. Id. at 903. See, e.g., People v. Smith, 129 Cal. Rptr. 498 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976)
(overturning the conviction of a defendant convicted of causing his wife to miscarry by
beating her, holding that a state statute proscribing the killing of a fetus with malice
aforethought only applied to a viable fetus); Hollis v. Commonwealth, 652 S.W.2d 61 (Ky.
1983) (overturning the conviction of a man found guilty of killing the unborn baby he did
not want by forcing his hand up his wife's vagina, holding that the state's common law
requires a murder victim be alive in order to be murdered).
133. Parness, supra note 22, at 903-04. Among the states are: Minnesota, in 1986
(proscribing premeditated, intentional, grossly negligent, and negligent acts causing the death
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states have expanded the breadth of tort law to cover harms to the fetus, in
addition to any claims already available to the mother. 134 However, states
have had considerably less success in protecting the unborn from their own
pregnant mothers. In some recent incidents, prosecutors have failed in their
efforts to hold pregnant mothers criminally liable for conduct that endangers
their fetuses, in part because of concerns about invading women's privacy
and because of the unavailability of laws specifically including pregnant
mothers as possible perpetrators.' aS State lawmakers have been unwilling
to rewrite criminal statutes to make such prosecutions possible, believing
that the threat of criminal prosecutions will dissuade women from seeking
prenatal care, prompt them to be less than honest with their doctors, and
possibly increase abortions, while doing little to cure or reduce drug
use. 136
B. FATHERS' PRE-BIRTH CONDUCT IN THE ADOPTION SETTING

However, a handful of states have begun to recognize the importance
of a father's pre-birth conduct toward the woman pregnant with his child
and have crafted legislation making such conduct germane to adoption
proceedings. For example, lawmakers in Florida, Kansas and Wisconsin

of the fetus or disabilities at birth); Illinois, in 1986 (recognizing fetuses as potential victims
of intentional homicide, voluntary and involuntary manslaughter, reckless homicide, and
simple and aggravated battery); North Dakota, in 1987 (bringing the unborn under the
statutes for murder, manslaughter, negligent homicide, and simple and aggravated assault);
Louisiana, in 1989 (creating three grades of criminal feticide); and Washington, in 1987
(redefining assault in the second degree to include acts that harm an unborn quick child).
Id. at 904.
134. Id. at 905-06.
135. Id. at 906-11. Examples include a 1989 case of an Illinois woman who prosecutors
sought to charge with involuntary manslaughter when her baby died two days after birth due
to complications caused by cocaine use shortly before the child's birth. The grand jury
declined to indict the woman, apparently in part due to concerns about the woman's right to
privacy and also because of the apparent inapplicability of the involuntary manslaughter
statute. In a 1988 Ohio case, the Ohio Supreme Court found that a statute proscribing
conduct creating a health or safety risk to a child under eighteen was not applicable in
prosecuting a mother for using cocaine during the third trimester of her pregnancy, causing
harm to the baby upon birth. And, in a 1986 California case, a trial court judge dismissed
a misdemeanor child abuse charge against a mother who disregarded her doctor's advice
regarding drug use, sexual conduct and medical care during pregnancy. Notwithstanding
language in the statute defining a child as one "conceived but not yet born," the judge ruled
the statute was not aimed at penalizing pregnant women for conduct during their pregnancies.
Id.
136. Id. at 909.
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have crafted laws that have, to varying degrees, made a biological father's
conduct toward the mother a relevant inquiry for the court when deciding
whether that father's consent to an adoption is required. 37 In all three
states, the statutory language and the subsequent interpretations by the courts
reflect that pre-birth conduct by the father, beyond merely paying for part
of the childbirth expenses, as is the extent of the inquiry under Illinois
law, 38 is to be considered.
Of the states that have begun looking to a biological father's pre-birth
conduct toward the mother as a yardstick for parental fitness and, hence,
standing to contest an adoption, Florida has received the most attention.
Florida law, as interpreted by the Supreme Court of Florida in In re
14° represents
Adoption of Doe 39 and In re Adoption of Baby E.A.W.,
the
most far-reaching efforts to hold fathers accountable for their conduct
toward the pregnant mother of their children, at least when determining
parentage rights. Under Florida's current Adoption Act, an unmarried father
is deemed to have waived his right to consent to the adoption of his child
if a finding of "abandonment" is made.141 Included in the definition of
"abandoned" is a sentence providing that, "In making this decision [ of
abandonment], the court may consider the conduct of a father toward the
child's mother during her pregnancy."'' 42 However, even under Florida's
prior definition of "abandoned," which did not include the sentence, the state
43
supreme court ruled that pre-birth conduct was nevertheless relevant.
The 1989 case of In re Adoption of Doe is considered perhaps the
seminal case nationally in which a father's pre-birth conduct toward the
pregnant mother was a pivotal factor in denying him parentage rights,
including the right to consent to his child's adoption. In the case, Richard
and Mary Roe met in Arizona and conceived a child out of wedlock.'"
Richard did not want the child, refused to wed Mary and urged her to have
137. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.032(14) (West 1992); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2136(h) (4)(5)
(West 1993); and Wis. STAT. ANN. § 48.415(6)(a)(2) and (6)(b) (West 1981-82). These three
states are not meant to comprise an exhaustive list of states that currently, either through
legislation or common law, take a biological father's pre-birth conduct into account when
determining parentage rights. Instead, they represent three approaches employed by
lawmakers to bring such pre-birth conduct of biological fathers into the adoption and custody
analysis.
138. 750 ILCS 50/l(D)(n)(2) (West 1993).
139. 543 So. 2d 741 (Fla.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 964 (1989).
140. 658 So. 2d 961 (Fla. 1995).
141. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.032(14) (West 1992).
142. Id.
143. In re Adoption of Doe, 543 So. 2d 741 (Fla.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 964 (1989).
144. Id. at 742.
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an abortion. Mary declined to have an abortion and after she lost her job
was forced to rely on public welfare and private charity. During the
pregnancy, Richard "failed to provide Mary with meaningful emotional or
financial support" and did not object when she told him she planned to put
the child up for adoption. 4 Mary moved to Florida and arranged for a
couple, the Does, to adopt her child. Two days after giving birth, Mary
signed an adoption agreement and the child was placed with the Does.'4
Richard then came forward to oppose the adoption, proposing marriage to
Mary and moving to Florida, where he signed an acknowledgment of
paternity. The adoptive parents refused to give up the child, but instead
filed an adoption petition, after parentage rights had been asserted by
Richard. In May, 1987, the trial court approved the adoption, ruling that
Mary had voluntarily consented to the adoption, while finding Richard's prebirth actions "estopped him from opposing the adoption," adding that "his
consent was not required because he had legally abandoned the child."'47
On appeal, the state district court 48 reversed the trial court, ruling that
Richard's pre-birth conduct "could not be used as a basis for abandonment"
because the state's definition of abandonment at the time required a failure
to make efforts to communicate with the child. 49 Because communication
with an unborn child is impossible, the district court found that as a matter
of law Richard could not have abandoned the child. Both the trial court and
district court agreed that, because of the bonding that had occurred between
the child and the adoptive parents, the child would be "psychologically
damaged" if removed from the adoptive parents at that point of the
proceedings. 5 However, the district court ruled a "best interests" analysis
' 51
was not a "relevant factor unless the child was available to be adopted,"'
much as the Illinois Supreme Court ruled in the "Baby Richard" case. Since

145. Id. at 742-43.
146. Id. at 743.
147. Id.
148. In re Adoption of John Doe, 524 So. 2d 1037 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
149. Doe, 543 So. 2d at 745. At the time Doe was decided, Florida did not have a
definition of "abandoned" in the state's adoption act. Instead, the definition was borrowed
from the state's juvenile statute (Fla. Stat. Ann. § 39.01(1)). In that act, the definition
provides that the parent, legal custodian, or person responsible for a child's welfare "while
being able, makes no provision for the child's support and makes no effort to communicate
with the child, which situation is sufficient to evince a willful rejection of parental
obligations." If the efforts of that person "are, in the opinion of the court, only marginal
efforts that do not evince a settled purpose to assume all parental duties, the court may
declare the child to be abandoned." Id.
150. Doe, 524 So. 2d at 1041 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
151. Id.
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the biological father in the Florida case was deemed to have been legally
unable to abandon the child, his consent to the adoption still was required.
Therefore, since there was no evidence Richard voluntarily consented to the
adoption, his parentage rights were found to be intact.'52
On appeal, the Florida Supreme Court reversed. The court began its
analysis by agreeing with the district court that the child's "bonding" with
the adoptive parents was not legally significant, despite its impacts on the
child's "best interests."'1 53 However, the court, citing the United States
Supreme Court ruling in Lehr v: Robertson,Tm added that the child's wellbeing is the "raison d'etre for determining whether a child has been
abandoned."' 55 The court then examined the issue of the abandonment
definition. Reversing the district court, the Florida Supreme Court found
that the required "failure to communicate" was crafted for use in the
Juvenile Act and that such failure to communicate was "not dispositive" in
56
deciding the abandonment issue for the purposes of the Adoption Act.
With that hurdle deftly cleared, the court went on to find that Richard's prebirth conduct was relevant to the issue of abandonment and "may be
properly introduced and used as a basis for finding abandonment under the
statute."''57 The court stated that the crux of the abandonment issue "turns
on the question of whether the parent has evinced a settled purpose to
assume parental duties."'5 8 After briefly examining the importance of
prenatal care to the eventual health of the child, the court found that a lack
of pre-birth support from the father to the mother is indeed relevant to an
inquiry of abandonment. 59 The court also stressed the public policy
interests protected by such a ruling, including "encouraging unwed fathers
to assume parental responsibilities" while preventing the financial burdens

152. Id. Although much of the reference to "support" appeared to be in the context of
financial contributions, the court left suggestions that the term could encompass emotional
and other, less tangible forms of support.
153. In re Adoption of Doe, 543 So. 2d 741, 744 (Fla. 1989).
154. 463 U.S. 248 (1983).
155. Doe, 543 So. 2d at 744.
156. Id. at 745.
157. Id. at 746.
158. Id.
159. Id.
Providing prebirth support to the unborn child is a parental duty. Evidence
of whether the parent has or has not furnished customary support to the
pregnant mother is relevant to the issue of abandonment. . . .[W]e hold
that an unwed father's prebirth conduct in providing or failing to provide
support responsibilities and medical expenses for the natural mother is
relevant to the issue of abandonment. Id.
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to society when fathers do not provide such support.' 6 To suggest a
father's pre-birth conduct is irrelevant in making a determination of
rights, is "legally, morally, and
abandonment, and hence deciding parental
61
socially indefensible," the court stated.
The Florida Supreme Court had the occasion to revisit the issue in 1995
in the case of In re Adoption of Baby E.A. W.' 62 In the case, the biological
63
father and mother lived together and conceived a child out of wedlock.
The father initially showed no reaction when told of the pregnancy, but
continued to live with the mother. The mother continued to work and pay
her own expenses until an accident forced her to leave her job. After that
point, the mother averred she received little emotional or financial support
from the father, buying food with food stamps and giving the father her
government aid check to pay for her other living expenses. For five months,
the mother repeatedly received "little, if any, emotional support" from the
father, who on one occasion was alleged to have "grabbed her, shook her,
and spit at her because she used his razor."' 64 Additionally, he "called her
names and verbally abused her" and was believed to have a drinking
problem. Moreover, during the pregnancy, the father resumed a sexual
relationship with a past girlfriend. 65 Finally, the mother moved out of the
father's home and told him she was going to place the child up for adoption,
to which the father allegedly consented. After the mother moved in with a
friend, the father still did not offer any emotional support to the mother and
the only phone calls he made to her came in the middle of the night, aimed
at harassing her. 66 However, the father contended he financially supported the mother for five months and purchased "one pair of stretch pants" for
the mother and a crib for the expected baby. 67 After the child was born,
the father was informed of the adoption proceedings by an attorneysaid he would not consent to the
intermediary. At that time, the father
68
adoption and sought legal counsel.
In the adoption proceedings, the trial court judge found by clear and
convincing evidence that the father had "financially and/or emotionally
abandoned the birth mother during her pregnancy" and, therefore, his

160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

Id. at 749.
Id. at 746.
658 So. 2d 961 (Fla. 1995).
Id. at 964.
Id. at 964.
Id. at 965.
Id.at 964.

167. Id.

168. Id.
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consent to the adoption was not required. 69 In so ruling, the trial court
had the benefit of the new statutory definition of "abandoned" in the
Adoption Act, which was amended in 1992 to expand the definition 1to70
include consideration of a father's pre-birth conduct toward the mother.
The judge ruled that, even if the father had paid half of the couple's
expenses, he also was living off of her food stamps and government support
check. The court also emphasized that the mother was "on her own
emotionally during the pregnancy."'1' In 1994, a three-judge panel of the
Florida District Court of Appeals reversed, finding that the father's72
abandonment had not been proven by clear and convincing evidence.1
The panel acknowledged the conflicting testimony, but found the father had
financially supported the mother while the couple lived together and that he
had objected to the adoption. Further, the panel stated that "emotional
support" could not be used to prove abandonment. 173 However, after a
hearing en banc, the district court reversed the panel's decision, ruling74 that
the father had both emotionally and financially abandoned the baby.
On certification, the Florida Supreme Court affirmed the full district
court's ruling, finding that "a trial court, in making a determination of
abandonment, may consider the lack of emotional support and/or emotional
abuse by the father of the mother during her pregnancy."'75 The court
suggested that, even had the definition of "abandoned" not been expanded,
the court's holding under In re Adoption of Doe 76 left open the door for
77
an analysis of a father's support beyond mere financial assistance.
However, after addition of the new language to the definition, "[w]e find
that ... the Legislature clearly did not limit 'conduct' to financial support.
Conduct generally connotes behavior."'178 In so ruling, the court also
declined to quantify how much weight a court should give to the father's

169.
170.
171.
172.

Id.
Fla. Stat. Anti. § 63.032(14) (Supp. 1992).
658 So. 2d at 965.
In re Adoption of Baby E.A.W., 647 So. 2d 918 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994).

173. Id. at 949. "To rely on a father's lack of emotional support for the mother during

pregnancy, without any showing that the lack of emotional support so harmed the mother that
the child she was carrying suffered direct physical injury, is entirely too vague a standard on
which to base a finding of abandonment." Id.
174. Id.
175. In re Adoption of Baby E.A.W., 658 So. 2d at 965.
176. 543 So. 2d 741 (Fla. 1989).
177. In re Adoption of Baby E.A.W., 658 So. 2d at 965.
178. Id. at 966. "[We conclude that the Legislature's use of the general term 'conduct'
...allows a court to consider prebirth conduct such as emotional support and/or abuse by
the father of the mother during the pregnancy." Id.

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 16

lack of emotional support, instead holding that such an analysis is "factspecific" and left to the discretion of the trial courts.
Similarly, in Wisconsin, the state's Children's Code and case law
interpreting it allows courts to look beyond mere financial support when
considering whether to deprive a putative father of his parentage rights.
Under the Children's Code, parental rights can be terminated by a finding
of any one of eight conditions, s° including a "failure to assume parental
responsibility.''. In deciding whether a father's conduct has fallen into
this category, the statute provides courts may consider whether the father
"expressed concern for or interest in the support, care or well-being of the
child or the mother during her pregnancy."'18 2 In applying the statute, the
Wisconsin Supreme Court has stated that, "[iut is clear, therefore, that the
legislature intended that a father's pre-delivery behavior be a consideration
in determining whether the father had established a substantial parental
relationship."'81 3 In the case of In re Baby Girl K.,'8 the state high court
affirmed a trial court ruling that deprived a putative father of his parental
rights because of both his pre-birth and post-birth conduct. Specifically, the
court pointed to evidence that the father had (1) asked the pregnant mother
to smuggle marijuana to him in prison; (2) physically assaulted the mother
while she was pregnant; (3) had failed to provide "care or support" to the
mother during the pregnancy, though "he had the opportunity and ability to
do so;" (4) failed to show any proof he tried to contact the child after birth;
and (5) failed to pay for any of the mother's medical expenses resulting
from the pregnancy and delivery of the child.18 5 In examining the father's
pre-birth conduct, the court's language strongly suggested that the trial court
could have deprived the father of his parentage rights on the basis of that
pre-birth conduct alone, without the need to consider the accompanying
post-birth behavior. 8 6 As in Florida, the Wisconsin Supreme Court also

. 179. Id. at 966. "We are not in a position to assign weight in this manner. The
determination of abandonment is fact-specific and, absent direction from the Legislature, we
cannot dictate to trial courts precisely how to evaluate the factors that go into making this
decision." Id.
180. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 48.415 (West 1981-82).
181. Id. at § 48.415(6). Under the language of the statute, a father must establish a
"substantial parental relationship with the child." Id. at § 48.415(6)(a)(2).
182. Id. at § 48.415(6)(b).
183. li re Baby Girl K., 335 N.W.2d 846, 851 (Wis. 1983).
184. Id.
185. Id. at 852.
186. Id. at 851. "Because what happens to a fetus in utero can have a significant
impact upon the quality of life a child will have after birth, we conclude that a parent's
action prior to a child's birth can form a sufficient basis for determining whether that parent
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8 7 for support that a putative father's due
pointed to Lehr v. Robertson"
process right to custody of his biological child is not absolute, but
contingent upon his conduct toward the child.188 As a result, the father's
consent was found unnecessary and the adoption was affirmed.
In Kansas, the state's Adoption and Relinquishment Act lists seven
conditions which can be proven to deprive a putative father of his parentage
rights. 8 9 Among the considerations are two relating to pre-birth conduct,
including one relating to "support for the mother during the six months"
before birth"9 and another to abandonment. 9' In subsequent cases, the
Court of Appeals of Kansas has found that such "support" can include92
financial support, living with the mother and inquiring about her health,
or even an offer of marriage from the putative father to the mother.' 93

IV. RETHINKING ILLINOIS LAW TO WEIGH A FATHER'S PRE-BIRTH
CONDUCT--WOULD IT HAVE CHANGED "BABY RICHARD?"

In considering the adoption laws of Florida, Wisconsin and Kansas, the
question must be raised: Was Illinois' "Baby Richard" a victim of geography? Would his fate have been different if the soap opera saga preceding his
birth had taken place in Florida instead of Illinois? An examination of the
facts in the "Baby Richard" case, when analyzed under the adoption laws in
these other states, suggests a different outcome was likely. If Kirchner's
conduct toward Baby Richard's mother during her pregnancy had been fully

has established a parental relationship with the child." Id.
187. 463 U.S. 248 (1983).
188. In re Baby Girl K, 335 N.W.2d 846, 851 (Wis. 1983).
189. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2136(h) (West 1993).
190. Id. at § 59-2136(h)(4) (providing parental rights may be terminated upon a finding
that "the father, after having knowledge of the pregnancy, failed without reasonable cause
to provide support for the mother during the six months prior to the child's birth").
191. Id. at § 59-2136(h)(5) (providing parental rights may be terminated upon a finding
that "the father abandoned the mother after having knowledge of the pregnancy").
192. In re Adoption of Baby Boy S., 822 P.2d 76 (Kan. Ct. App. 1991). In the case,
the court affirmed a trial court ruling that a father failed to provide "support" for mother
during six months before the child's birth. Evidence at trial showed the father did not
provide food or money to the mother, lived with the mother during the pregnancy "four
weeks at most" and "made no effort to inquire after the welfare of the mother in her pregnant
condition." Id. at 78.
193. Inre K.D.O., 889 P.2d 1158 (Kan. Ct. App. 1995) (affirming a trial court ruling
that a putative father's parental rights should not be terminated after evidence showed he
offered the mother financial support and proposed marriage upon learning of her pregnancy,
both offers which were rejected by the mother).
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explored and could have been properly considered, it seems likely the courts
would have deprived Kirchner of standing to contest Richard's adoption.
Considering the conflicting information about Kirchner's behavior and the
mother's accusations of abuse and subsequent recantations, such an
examination of what Kirchner did or did not do would have at least resolved
some of the serious concerns the public and Richard's adoptive parents held
about the child's fate with Kirchner.' 94 Therefore, for those lawmakers
and other public officials infuriated by the outcome of the case, amending
Illinois' Adoption Act or analyzing it differently to allow courts to consider
a father's pre-birih conduct in deciding his standing to contest an adoption
might be the surest way to prevent another "Baby Richard" situation.
A. APPLYING OUTSIDE LAW TO THE "BABY RICHARD" CASE

When seeking to analyze how the "Baby Richard" case would have
been decided in Florida, Kansas or Wisconsin, the nature of Kirchner's prebirth conduct, including his specific acts or omissions, must be examined.
This requirement immediately makes such an analysis difficult to perform
and renders it largely hypothetical. Because the current Illinois Adoption
Act and the common law have not been construed to consider this conduct
in determining a biological father's standing in adoption proceedings,
Kirchner's pre-birth conduct was never fully explored by the trial court.' 95
Also, such determinations are highly fact-specific and are, by their nature,
easily distinguishable on a case-by-case basis. However, based on the
original allegations made in the media by Richard's mother, Janikova, a
rough outline of Kirchner's conduct can be made and analyzed under
various state laws. Among the instances of Kirchner's behavior that likely
would be considered relevant are: his repeated failure to marry the expectant
mother; his continued relationship with his former lover, Zuzicova; his trip
to Czechoslovakia during the eighth month of Janikova's pregnancy--a trip
he allegedly made with Zuzicova; Janikova's allegations upon entering a
battered women's shelter that Kirchner "pushed her" and mentally abused
her; and Kirchner's failure to seek to visit Janikova or her doctor in the
weeks before Richard's birth. Likewise, instances of Kirchner's positive
194. For a more detailed discussion of these concerns and how they contributed to the
heated controversy that surrounded the "Baby Richard" case, see supra notes 14-20 and 28-31
and accompanying text.
195. Kirchner's pre-birth conduct toward the mother was taken into consideration by

the Illinois Appellate Court in its ruling. See supra notes 58-62. However, in light of the
Illinois Supreme Court's reversal of that ruling, the language calling for consideration of a
father's pre-birth conduct under the current Adoption Act must be considered inoperative.
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behavior, including his financial support of Janikova during much of the
pregnancy, his payment of the birth expenses, his continued offers of
financial support to Janikova, and his repeated efforts to make amends with
Janikova before Richard's birth also would probably be deemed relevant. 196
Under the adoption laws currently in place in Florida, Kansas and
Wisconsin, Kirchner's pre-birth conduct toward the mother could have
provided sufficient grounds for stripping him of his constitutionally
protected parentage rights, as the laws in those states have been interpreted
by the courts. For example, under the far-reaching Florida law,' 97 a
biological father can be deprived of his parentage rights if a finding of
"abandonment" is made. To make such a determination, the courts are
entitled specifically to consider the father's conduct toward the mother
during the pregnancy.' 9 In applying the law, the Florida courts have
found "abandonment" existed in cases where: (1) the father offered no
emotional support to the pregnant mother and no financial support for much
of the pregnancy;' 99 and (2) the father offered only brief, token financial
support, no emotional support, on one occasion was alleged to have grabbed,
shaken and spit on the pregnant mother, called her names and verbally
abused her, and resumed a sexual relationship with a past girlfriend." °
Although Kirchner's financial support distinguished the "Baby Richard" case
from the former case and his alleged conduct toward Janikova does not
appear as egregious as in the latter, there are clear bases for comparisons.
And, considering the Florida Supreme Court's clear statement in In re
Adoption of Baby E.A. W., that a failure to provide emotional support alone
can constitute abandonment, it is probable Kirchner's conduct would be
legally suspect. Therefore, despite the obvious factual differences distinguishing the Illinois and Florida cases, it remains fair to suggest that if
Florida law had applied to the "Baby Richard" case, the courts might well
have had sufficient grounds to find Kirchner had "abandoned" Baby Richard,
based on Kirchner's pre-birth conduct toward Janikova. 2
196. For a more complete discussion of these events, see supra notes 37-46 and
accompanying text.
197. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.032(14) (West 1992).
198. For the exact wording of the Florida statute and a more complete examination of
the law and its interpretation by the courts, see supra notes 137-173 and accompanying text.
199. In re Adoption of Doe, 543 So. 2d 741 (Fla.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 964 (1989).
200. In re Adoption of Baby E.A.W., 658'So. 2d 961 (Fla. 1995).
201. Such a conclusion is not difficult to make, based on Justice Rizzi's decision at the
appellate court level. For a more complete examination of Justice Rizzi's decision, which
apparently in error included consideration of Kirchner's pre-birth conduct, see supra notes
58-62.
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Similarly, while the adoption laws in Kansas and Wisconsin are not as
explicit as Florida's in allowing the consideration of a father's pre-birth
conduct when determining his parentage rights, it nevertheless appears
Kirchner's conduct toward the pregnant Janikova might have been sufficient
to persuade the courts in those states to strip him of his right to withhold
consent to Richard's adoption. Under Wisconsin law, 2 a father's parental
rights can be terminated by, among other things, a "failure to assume
parental responsibility." Applying the statute, the Wisconsin Supreme Court
deprived one father of his parentage rights upon a finding of several
instances of mistreatment of the pregnant mother, but included mention of
his failure to provide "care or support" to the mother during the pregnancy. 20 3 Although it is uncertain whether this behavior alone would have
warranted the deprivation of parentage rights under Wisconsin law, the fact
the Wisconsin high court singled out the father's failure to provide such
intangible support suggests Kirchner's behavior toward Janikova also would
have faced serious scrutiny. Likewise, under Kansas law, °4 a provision
requiring biological fathers to provide support for the mother during the six
months prior to the child's birth could have been pivotal in the "Baby
Richard" case. In cases interpreting the law, the Kansas courts considering
the "support" question weighed such factors as how long a father lived with
the pregnant mother and whether he inquired as to her health 205 and
whether a father offered to marry the pregnant mother. 20 6 Again, such
analyses are highly fact-specific, but it appears from these states' case law
that Kirchner's conduct toward Janikova could provide sufficient grounds
to deprive him of his parentage rights.
B. AMENDING ILLINOIS LAW

At first blush, the analyses applied by the Florida, Wisconsin, and
Kansas courts to deprive biological fathers of their parentage rights do not
appear significantly different from the analysis used by the Illinois Appellate
Court to refuse Kirchner custody of "Baby Richard." Both the other states
and the Illinois Appellate Court considered the biological father's pre-birth
conduct toward the pregnant mother and used the findings to strip the father
of his parentage rights. However, while the other state rulings were

202.
203.
204.
205.
206.

WiS. STAT. ANN. § 48.415 (West 1981-82).
In re Baby Girl K., 335 N.W.2d 846, 851 (Wis. 1983).
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2136(h) (West 1993).
In re Adoption of Baby Boy S., 822 P.2d 76 (Kan. Ct. App. 1991).
In re K.D.O., 889 P.2d 1158 (Kan. Ct. App. 1995).
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undisturbed, the Illinois Appellate Court's ruling was reversed by the Illinois
Supreme Court and its analysis discredited.
The reason for the different outcomes lies, in part, in the point in the
adoption proceedings at which the father's pre-birth conduct is considered.
In the "Baby Richard" case, the Illinois Appellate Court weighed Kirchner's
conduct toward the pregnant Janikova as part of an effort to determine
whether it would be in the "best interests" of Richard to be placed with
Kirchner or the adoptive parents.20 7 However, the Illinois Supreme Court
ruled a "best interests" analysis could only be performed when a child was
available for adoption, which could only come after the biological father had
consented to the adoption or his consent was deemed waived by his postbirth conduct. 208 Therefore, until Kirchner was legally deprived of his
parentage rights,2" such a "best interests" analysis was premature, as was
consideration of Kirchner's pre-birth conduct. Under existing Illinois law,
as shaped by the United States Supreme Court's rulings granting biological
fathers limited parentage rights, such a ruling appears unavoidable." 0
Under Supreme Court precedent, biological fathers have due process
parentage rights, but those rights are determined, in large part, by whether
the father accepts the duties of a parent and establishes a relationship with
his child. Under the Illinois Supreme Court's ruling in In re Adoption of
Syck, 1 those constitutionally protected parentage rights trump the "best
interests of the child," which cannot be considered until the father is
properly stripped of those parentage rights. Therefore, unless a father is
found to be an "unfit person" under one of the seventeen "grounds of
unfitness" under the Adoption Act,21 2 his pre-birth conduct is to remain
largely ignored, under the current common law treatment of the Act.
However, in Florida, Wisconsin and Kansas, the father's pre-birth
conduct toward the mother is considered earlier in the process. In these
states, the biological father's conduct toward the pregnant mother is a
relevant factor in deciding whether he should be stripped of his parentage
rights because he has "abandoned" or failed to sufficiently "support" the
207. In re Petition of Doe, 627 N.E.2d 648, 649-51', (Il. App. Ct. 1993), rev'd, 638
N.E.2d 181 (Il1.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 499 (1994).
208. In re Petition of Doe, 638 N.E.2d 181 (Ill.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct 499 (1994).
209. The appellate court ruled Kirchner had failed to establish the requisite interest in
Richard during the child's first thirty days of life. However, the Illinois Supreme Court ruled
such a finding could not be made when the lack of interest resulted from deception. Doe,
638 N.E.2d 181.
210. For a summary of the Supreme Court's rulings on putative fathers' rights, see
supra notes 100-110.
211. 562 N.E.2d 174 (I1. 1990).
212. 750 ILCS 50/1 (West 1993) (amended 1994).
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child. Unlike the Illinois Appellate Court's "Baby Richard" decision, where
pre-birth conduct was used in a "best interests" analysis, these states use the
pre-birth conduct analysis to determine if the biological father has standing
to participate in the adoption proceedings at all. If his pre-birth conduct
toward the mother is found inappropriate, his parentage rights are stripped
and any subsequent "best interests" analysis proceeds without him. By
considering pre-birth conduct to determine a biological father's standing,
these states appear to be in step with Supreme Court precedent, which has
made a biological father's contact and relationship with the child the major
yardstick by which the father's parentage rights may be deprived or found
not to arise at all. Therefore, while the difference between the two
approaches seems almost semantic, the timing of when courts consider prebirth conduct is crucial.
A handful of suitable options appear available to Illinois judges and
lawmakers seeking to effect the results of the statutes in these other states
and place consideration of a father's pre-birth conduct on the table in
adoption proceedings. Under one scenario, judges can make the changes
themselves by simply ruling that such paternal pre-birth conduct is germane
to whether a father is an "unfit person" whose consent to the adoption of his
biological children is unnecessary. 1 3 However, instead of including such
a consideration in a "best interests" analysis, as was done by the Illinois
Appellate Court and discredited by the Illinois Supreme Court, courts would
be required to find the pre-birth conduct relevant to one of the seventeen
current grounds of "unfitness" under the statute.214 For example, a father's
conduct toward the pregnant mother could be deemed relevant when
considering whether there was a showing of "abandonment of the
child., 215 Such an expansion of the judicially recognized definition of
"abandonment" would put Illinois courts on par with Florida, which first
considered paternal pre-birth conduct under the "abandonment" penumbra.216 Similarly, the father's pre-birth conduct also could be considered
part of several other "unfitness" grounds currently available under law,
including provisions involving: a "failure to maintain a reasonable degree of
interest, concern or responsibility as to the child's welfare; ' 217 "other
neglect of, or misconduct toward the child;"2 8 or as part of the consideration of whether there has been sufficient "contact or communication by a
213. Id.

214.
215.
216.
217.
218.

Id.

750 ILCS 50/1(a).
In re Adoption of Doe, 543 So. 2d 741 (Fla.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 964 (1989).
750 ILCS 50/1(b).
750 ILCS 50/1(h).
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parent with his or her child." 21 9 However, because extensive case law
does not exist to warrant such an expansion, any such ruling by a trial court
would be legally suspect until affirmed by the Illinois Supreme Court,
which, based upon the tone of its "Baby Richard" decisions, probably would
not invite such judicial expansions of the current definitions.
The more simple, certain and probably more appropriate way of
exacting such changes would be through legislative amendments. Notwithstanding the "Baby Richard" laws passed in a hasty effort to change the
outcome of that case, a father's pre-birth conduct toward the mother remains
largely outside the realm of conduct that trial courts can examine in making
adoption determinations. However, a consideration of such conduct can
easily be written into the Illinois Adoption Act by specifically granting
courts the power to examine and weigh such conduct. For example, the
provision that gives Florida courts the explicit power to make such a
consideration' could easily be engrafted onto Illinois' "abandonment"
provision or any of the other "unfitness" provisions listed above that deal
generally with the father's conduct toward the child or mother. Likewise,
even more broad, open-ended language, such as that provided by Wisconsin, 221 could similarly be engrafted into the Illinois Adoption Act's "unfitness" provisions to make paternal pre-birth conduct a relevant, germane
inquiry for trial courts.
In the end, it remains uncertain how the "Baby Richard" case would
have been decided had it emerged in Florida, Wisconsin or Kansas.
Because determinations of "unfitness" are, by their nature, very fact-specific,
much of the decision would come down to the inclinations of the trial court
judge hearing the case. Given the uncertainty over exactly what transpired
between Kirchner and Janikova before "Baby Richard's" birth, predicting an
outcome under foreign state law is speculative at best. However, amending
Illinois law to specifically allow courts to consider such pre-birth conduct
would have cleared the way for a full hearing on Kirchner's conduct. It
might have been proven Janikova's original allegations of abuse were
accurate or other information unearthed. Likewise, the allegations might
have proven meritless and' Kirchner again granted custody of Richard.
However, in any case, allowing such a hearing would have at least helped
clear the air on the issue and crystallized public debate. If nothing else, a
more complete examination of Kirchner's pre-birth behavior might have
219. 750 ILCS 50/1(n).
220. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.032(14) (West. Supp. 1992). "In making this decision [of
abandonment], the court may consider the conduct of a father towards the child's mother
during her pregnancy." Id.
221. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 48.415 (West 1981-82).
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assuaged the concerns of that segment of the public disturbed by the "Baby
Richard" outcome, in part because of the uncertain future of a four-year-old
-boy.
CONCLUSION

Few Illinois court battles in recent times have so captured the public's
attention and sparked its ire than the controversial "Baby Richard" case.
The legal wrangling over the future of a four-year-old boy, caught in an
emotional tug-of-war between a biological father he had never met and his
adoptive parents, ignited fiery public debate and scalding criticisms of the
court. It carved deep rifts between the courts and their critics and led to a
blurring of the lines between judicial decision-making and public opinion.
At least part of the deep public concerns revolved around "Baby Richard's"
future with a biological father whose questionable conduct toward Richard's
pregnant mother was thrust piecemeal into the adoption debate by the media.
Through these accounts, the public learned the father repeatedly refused to
marry the mother, continued a relationship with a former lover, made a
questionable trip overseas shortly before the child's birth and, based on the
mother's own words, that the father had "shoved" her and otherwise
emotionally abused her. However, when the case was reviewed by the
Illinois Supreme Court, such considerations were not relevant. The "best
interests of the child" could not be considered as long as the father had not
been properly deprived of his parentage rights. Since the father was found
to have never properly forfeited those rights, his right to custody of his
biological child was deemed constitutionally protected.
Lawmakers, sensitive to the public outcry over the court ruling that
wrenched a four-year-old boy from the only parents he ever knew, made
last-ditch efforts to amend Illinois' adoption laws to alter the outcome.
However, their attempts could not affect "Baby Richard," whose case had
already been settled. In fact, despite significant changes to the Adoption
Act, Illinois law still protects the parentage rights of a biological father who
abides by the new amendments, regardless of that father's conduct toward
the mother during her pregnancy. But, even as the "Baby Richard" case
unfolded, the consideration in adoption proceedings of a biological father's
pre-birth conduct continued to gain support. In states such as Florida,
Wisconsin and Kansas, such behavior is deemed relevant and, in some case,
has been pivotal in determining who wins custody of a child. The laws in
those states, as interpreted by the courts, allow and even encourage trial
courts to consider how a father treats his pregnant mate in determining
whether that father should retain his right to withhold consent to the
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adoption of his child.
It is uncertain how the "Baby Richard" case would have unfolded in
those jurisdictions. Because Illinois law does not broadly recognize the
significance of a father's pre-birth conduct in the adoption setting beyond
financial support, the trial court in the "Baby Richard" case had no occasion
to hear evidence regarding how Otakar Kirchner treated Daniella Janikova
while she was pregnant and weigh that behavior in deciding whether to
grant Kirchner custody of Richard. However, in analyzing the limited
testimony of Kirchner's pre-birth conduct included in the trial record, along
with incidents of Kirchner's conduct that were reported in the media, it is
fair to suggest that Kirchner might have lost his parentage rights over
Richard had the controversy occurred in one of these other states. To be
certain, it is likewise possible Kirchner might have been exonerated of the
allegations of questionable conduct toward the pregnant Janikova and his
parentage rights reaffirmed. However, without a formal courtroom hearing
on the issue, the public was left to wonder what sort of person was winning
custody of four-year-old Richard.
If lawmakers truly are interested in the best interests of children caught
in adoption proceedings and want to ensure each is sent to the best home
possible, amending the Illinois Adoption Act to allow courts to consider a
father's pre-birth conduct toward the mother would be well worth the effort.
Such amendments could consist of a single sentence engrafted onto the
current grounds by which putative fathers are deemed "unfit," nearly all of
which now deal only with the father's conduct after the child is born. By
placing such pre-birth conduct at the front of the adoption analysis, when
determining a putative father's standing in adoption proceedings, rather than
rendering it an element in the "best interests" analysis late in the adoption
proceedings, lawmakers would be able to use a father's conduct toward his
pregnant mate as a factor to predict what type of father he would be to his
child, while not abridging the father's constitutional due process rights.
Creating an avenue for such considerations almost certainly will not remove
the sting from future difficult adoption rulings by the-courts and perhaps
might have done little to impact the "Baby Richard" case or quell the
serious misgivings held by the public. However, the minimal effort such
revisions in Illinois law would require almost certainly would be outweighed
by the benefits in giving courts yet another tool to determine parentage
rights and make the tough decisions on with whom adoptive children will
spend their lives.
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